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Abstract—Cyber-physical systems (CPS), such as au-
tonomous vehicles crossing an intersection, are vulnerable to
cyber-attacks and their safety-critical nature makes them a
target for malicious adversaries. This paper studies the problem
of supervisory control of autonomous intersections in the
presence of sensor attacks. Sensor attacks are performed when
an adversary gains access to the transmission channel and
corrupts the measurements before they are received by the
decision-making unit. We show that the supervisory control
system is vulnerable to sensor attacks that can cause collision
or deadlock among vehicles. To improve the system resilience,
we introduce a detector in the control architecture and focus
on stealthy attacks that cannot be detected but are capable of
compromising safety. We then present a resilient supervisory
control system that is safe, non-deadlocking, and maximally
permissive, despite the presence of disturbances, uncontrolled
vehicles, and sensor attacks. Finally, we demonstrate how the
resilient supervisor works by considering illustrative examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are vulnerable to cyber-
attacks and their safety-critical nature makes them a target for
malicious adversaries. In this paper, we study the problem
of supervisory control of autonomous intersections in the
presence of sensor attacks. Sensor attacks are performed
when an adversary gains access to the transmission channel
and corrupts the measurements before they are received by
the decision-making unit. Such attacks can put the system at
risk by interfering with the operation of the control system.
Recent advances in transportation technology indicate
that autonomous intersections will be possible in the near
future. The aim of autonomous intersections is to pro-
vide a safe, scalable, and efficient framework for coordi-
nating autonomous vehicles. In the literature, there exist
numerous protocols for autonomous intersections [12], [3],
[14]. Among these approaches, studying the problem of
autonomous intersection in the context of supervisory control
of discrete event systems has received increasing attention
since it allows incorporating the continuous dynamics and
formally analyzing system safety [8], [10], [11], [1].
Supervisory control for autonomous intersections has three
requirements: (1) safety, i.e., collisions must be avoided; (2)
non-blockingness, i.e., vehicles should not deadlock; and (3)
maximal-permissiveness, i.e., vehicles must not be restricted
unless necessary [7]. A supervisory controller that satisfies
these requirements is designed for a set of controlled and
uncontrolled vehicles considering an unknown disturbance
[10]. This is done by creating a finite discrete event system
abstraction of the continuous system and formulating the
problem in the context of supervisory control for discrete
event systems. Further, the supervisor is reconstructed to
handle bounded measurement uncertainties [11].
In this paper, we study the resilience of the system when
deception attacks are performed on sensor measurements by
a malicious omniscient adversary [6]. The problem is related
to supervisory control with imperfect measurements [11].
However, sensor attack can be designed strategically and may
have different effects from imperfect measurements.
Concerns about resiliency of supervisory control systems
is not recent as it has been addressed in the area of fault-
tolerant control [18], [22]. An approach for monitoring and
diagnosis of hybrid systems that integrate model-based and
statistical methods is proposed in [22]. Further, a framework
for fault-tolerant control of discrete event systems is designed
that ensures the system recovers from any fault [20]. How-
ever, the focus is on known faults rather than unknown and
carefully designed cyber-attacks.
Cyber-security of control systems has been studied for
different classes of systems. It is shown that knowledge of
the physical system can be used for attack detection by
considering malicious attacks on process control systems
[5]. Denial-of-service attacks are studied for discrete-time
linear dynamical systems [2]. Further, detection limitations
for CPS are characterized in [16]. In particular, it is shown
that an attack is undetectable if the measurements due to the
attack coincide with the measurements due to some nominal
operating condition.
Our objective is to study the problem of resilient super-
visory control of autonomous intersections in the presence
of sensor attacks. We introduce a detector in the control
architecture with the purpose of detecting deception attacks
on sensors. This detector incorporates knowledge of the
physical system with the previously received data and detects
a wide range of sensor attacks. Nevertheless, there exist
stealthy attacks that cannot be detected but are capable of
compromising safety. To address this issue, we design a
resilient supervisor that maintains safety even in the presence
of stealthy attacks. The resilient supervisor consists of an es-
timator that computes the smallest state estimate compatible
with the control inputs and measurements seen thus far. We
prove that the estimated set contains the true state of the sys-
tem even if the measurements are corrupted and we show that
the set of estimated states depends on the detector threshold.
We then formulate the resilient supervisory control problem
and present a solution. We demonstrate how the resilient
supervisor works by considering illustrative examples.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II defines the system model and sensor attacks, followed
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Fig. 1: Two-vehicle autonomous intersection
by formulation of the problem. In Section III, we introduce a
detector in the system architecture and characterize stealthy
attacks. We design the resilient supervisor in Section IV. In
Section V, we illustrate how the resilient supervisor works by
providing some examples. We conclude the paper in Section
VI with discussion and future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Plant
We use the system model presented in [10]. Consider a set
N = {1, ..., n} of vehicles driving towards an intersection.
The vehicles are modeled as single integrators and their
dynamics are described by
x˙ = v + d (1)
where x ∈ X ⊂ Rn is the state (i.e., position), v ∈ V ⊂ Rn
is the control input (i.e., speed), and d ∈ D ⊂ Rn is a
disturbance input representing unmodeled dynamics. Assume
v ∈ V is a vector with elements in the finite set {µa, µ(a+
1), ..., µb}, where µ ∈ R+ and a, b ∈ N. We refer to aµ and
bµ as vmin and vmax. The disturbance signal is bounded by
[dmin, dmax]
n, and vmin+dmin ≥ µ, so that µ is the lowest
possible speed. We assume that a subset of the vehicles are
uncontrolled. To represent uncontrolled vehicles, we partition
the vector v into two subvectors vc ∈ Vc and vuc ∈ Vuc, such
that v = (vc, vuc) and V = Vc × Vuc, where vc denotes the
inputs of the controlled vehicles and vuc denotes the inputs
of the uncontrollable vehicles.
Assume the control input is kept constant over each time
interval [kτ, (k+1)τ ]. Define the time τ discretization of the
system (1) as
xk+1 = xk + uk + δk (2)
where xk = x(kτ), uk = v(kτ)τ , and δk =
∫ (k+1)τ
kτ
d(t)dt.
Define U = V τ and ∆ = Dτ , and we have u ∈ U and
δ ∈ ∆. Also, let U = Uc×Uuc, where Uc is the set of inputs
for the controllable vehicles and Uuc is the set of inputs for
the uncontrollable vehicles. Denote by u = (uc, uuc) the
actions of the controllable and uncontrollable vehicles for
any u ∈ U .
For each road l, let [αl, βl] ⊂ R denote the part of the road
that is in the intersection as shown in Fig. 1. Let i ∈ Πl, if
vehicle i drives along road l. A collision occurs between
two vehicles i ∈ Πl and j ∈ Πl′ with l 6= l′, whenever xi ∈
[αl, βl] and xj ∈ [αl′ , βl′ ] simultaneously. Further, assuming
γ ∈ R is the minimum safe distance between vehicles driving
on the same road, a rear-end collision occurs when |xi −
xj | < γ, xi ≤ βl, xj ≤ βl, and i, j ∈ Πl. Calling the set
of all the collision points the bad set B ⊂ X , no collision
occurs if the system never reaches a state in B. A trajectory
x(t) of (1) is defined safe, if:
inf
t≥0,b′∈B
||x(t)− b′||∞ > 0 (3)
B. Sensor Attacks and Problem Formulation
Sensor attacks are performed when an adversary compro-
mises some sensors and corrupts the measurements before
they are received by the decision-making unit [6]. Such
attacks, which compromise integrity of the measurements,
may lead to collision or deadlock among vehicles. To model
sensor attacks, we assume Ta = [ks, ke) is the period
of attack and ei(kτ) ∈ E ⊆ R, is an error added to
sensor i at timestep k ∈ Ta. Defining e(kτ) as the vector
(e1(kτ), ..., en(kτ)), the corrupted measurement vector x˜ is
described by
x˜(kτ) = x(kτ) + e(kτ), k ∈ Ta (4)
We assume there exists Tmax ∈ R+ such that |Ta| ≤
Tmax. Because of the non-blockingness property, vehicles
eventually cross the intersection, and therefore scenarios
involving specific cars and intersections have a finite-time
horizon. Since the sensor attack is launched on individual ve-
hicles, the maximum attack duration, Tmax, can be assumed
to be finite. This variable can be selected as the maximum
time it takes for a single vehicle to cross the intersection,
which can easily be computed given the minimum speed (i.e.,
vmin + dmin) and the set of initial states. It should be noted
that this implies an assumption that the initial state of a car
is not corrupted. Although this assumption is restrictive, it is
reasonable since detection of cars approaching intersections
can be performed also with other means than the vehicles
sensors. Also, if this assumption is not true an adversary
can add ”zombie” cars (i.e., cars that do not exist) or
make existing cars ”invisible”, in which case, the detection
and control problems considered in the paper are not well-
defined.
Our goal is to design a supervisory controller that main-
tains the system’s operational goals even in the presence
of sensor attacks. These operational goals are: (1) safety,
i.e., collisions must be avoided; (2) non-blockingness, i.e.,
vehicles must eventually cross the intersection; and (3)
maximal-permissiveness, i.e., vehicles must not be restricted
unless necessary [10].
III. ATTACK DETECTION
To be resilient to sensor attacks, a common approach is to
employ detection mechanisms that detect attacks before they
can cause significant damage.
A. Detector
We use a nonparametric Cumulative sum (CUSUM) statis-
tic as our detection method [4]. The detector’s goal is to
determine whether a sequence of vectors z(1), z(2), ..., z(N)
is generated through the system being under normal behavior
(H0) or attack (H1). Similar to [5], to formulate the detector
and to avoid making limiting assumptions on the attacker’s
behavior, we assume the expected value of a random process
Z(k) that generates z(k) is less than zero in the case of
normal behavior, and greater than zero in the case of attack.
We denote by Postucx, the set of all the reachable states
given a state x and an input uc, that is, Postuc(x) :=
∪uuc∈Uuc,d∈D (x+ u+ d). Given a measurement x˜i(k), the
parameter zi(k) is defined for every vehicle i as
zi(k) := inf
xˆi(k)∈Postui (x˜i(k−1))
||x˜i(k)− xˆi(k)|| − bi (5)
where bi ∈ R is a small constant chosen in a way that
EH0 [zi(k)] < 0.
The CUSUM statistic is described by:
Ci(k) = (Ci(k − 1) + zi(k))+ (6)
where Ci(0) = 0, and (a)+ = a if a ≥ 0.
Assigning ηi as the threshold chosen based on a desired
false alarm rate, the corresponding decision rule is defined
as
d(Ci(k)) =
{
H1 if Ci(k) > ηi
H0 otherwise
(7)
We assume that upon detection (i.e., d(Ci(k)) = H1 for a
k), the system switches to a mode where vehicles are either
driven manually or controlled by a fail-safe controller.
B. Stealthy Attacks
Although the detector can identify attacks that cause a
large difference between received measurements and pre-
dicted states (i.e., detectable attacks), a skilled attacker may
attempt to evade this scheme via performing stealthy attacks
[5]. This is done by keeping the detector’s output below the
threshold of detection and not triggering an alert. Stealthy
attacks exist in our system because of the following factors:
(i) Detector’s threshold: As shown in Fig. 2, small thresholds
(i.e., η → 0) reduce the size of stealthy attacks space. This
means a system designer should always select the smallest
possible threshold to achieve maximum resiliency. However,
employment of detectors with small thresholds results in high
false alarm rates in realistic noisy environments. This is why
thresholds are often chosen non-zero (i.e., η 6= 0), which
allows an adversary to launch stealthy attacks.
(ii) Disturbance and uncontrolled vehicles: Disturbance and
uncontrolled vehicles add non-deterministic behavior to the
system. This makes it impossible to perform exact state
estimation. Hence, as long as the measurements due to the
attack cannot be differentiated from the measurements due
to some normal operation, the attack remains stealthy [16].
Stealthy attacks must be characterized and countermea-
sures for securing the system against them must be designed.
To do so, we characterize stealthy attacks for the detector
Fig. 2: Choosing a small threshold for the detector reduces
size of stealthy attack space Is.
Fig. 3: Sensor attack is stealthy if x˜ ∈ [xˆmin − (η + b −
C), xˆmax + η + b− C].
(7). We do this by deriving a condition for error vector ek
given the actual state x(kτ), which is only known by the
attacker. We define xˆmax(kτ) := maxPostuk−1(x˜k−1) and
xˆmin(kτ) := minPostuk−1(x˜k−1) 1.
Lemma 1: (Stealthy Attacks): A sensor attack with eT ∈
En×|T | is stealthy iff for all k ∈ Ta we have ek ∈ [
¯
ek, e¯k]
where
¯
ek(x(k), C(k− 1)) = −x(k) + xˆmin(k)− η− b+C(k− 1),
e¯k(x(k), C(k−1)) = −x(k) + xˆmax(k) + η+ b−C(k−1).
Proof: We show a corrupted vector x˜(k) bypasses the
detector if and only if it is within the stated bound. Let
x˜(k) ∈ X be a stealthy attack ⇔ C(k) < η ⇔ C(k − 1) +
z(k) < η ⇔ C(k − 1) + inf ||x˜(k)− xˆ(k)|| − b < η ⇔ for
each i we have inf |x˜i(k)− xˆi(k)| < ηi + bi−Ci(k− 1) ⇔
inf |xi(k)+ei(k)−xˆi(k)| < ηi+bi−Ci(k−1). Solving this,
we have −xi(k)+ xˆi,min(k)−ηi−bi+Ci(k−1) < ei(k) <
−xi(k) + xˆi,max(k) + ηi+ bi−Ci(k−1) ⇔
¯
e < ek < e¯.
The above lemma characterizes stealthy attacks by de-
riving a condition for error vector ek assuming the actual
state is known. We use (4) and Lemma 1 to define a set of
stealthy attacks Isk ⊆ X , which contains all the corrupted
measurements x˜k that are stealthy.
Lemma 2: (Stealthy Attacks Space): A sensor attack with
eT ∈ En×|T | is undetectable iff for all k ∈ Ta, the measure-
ment x˜k belongs to stealthy attacks set Isk : X×Uc×R→ 2X
1We temporarily abuse notation and exclude τ when referring to a time
kτ .
Fig. 4: Assuming k = k′ + Tmax, either x˜k′ or x˜k is not
attacked.
described by
Isk(x˜k−1, uk−1, Ck−1) =
[xˆmin,k − η − b+ C, xˆmax,k + η + b− C] (8)
IV. RESILIENT SUPERVISORY CONTROL SYSTEM
In this section, we design a resilient supervisory control
system that is secure against stealthy attacks. This is done by
taking the following steps: (1) Designing an estimator system
that computes the smallest state estimate compatible with
the sequence of control inputs and possibly corrupted mea-
surements received; (2) Formulating the supervisory control
problem given the estimator system with respect to a state
space discretization; (3) Solving the problem by creating
a discrete event system (DES) abstraction of the estimator
system, translating the control problem to the abstracted
domain, solving it, and translating the results back to the
continuous domain.
A. Estimator
We present a method to compute the smallest state es-
timate compatible with the sequence of control inputs and
possibly corrupted measurements received. We first use the
assumption on maximum duration of sensor attacks to find
a set that surely contains the actual state of the system
even if measurements are corrupted. We then present a
prediction-correction scheme based on the work in [11],
which computes a set of predicted states and then corrects it.
Finally, we design an estimator system that receives as inputs
the measurements, the control inputs, and the detector’s
statistics and computes the smallest state set that contains
the actual state.
In the following, we assume k′ = k − Tmax and we
define an extension of post-operator as Postuc,1...uc,mx =
x+
∑i=m
i=1 uc,i +
⋃
uuc,i∈Uuc,δi∈∆
∑i=m
i=1 uuc,i + δi.
Lemma 3: Given measurements x˜k and x˜k′ , and previ-
ously chosen controllable inputs (uc,k′ , ..., uc,k−1), output
of function Iˆk : X × Uc ... Uc︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tmax
×X → 2X defined by
Iˆk(x˜k′ , uk′ , ..., uk, x˜k) = {Postuc,k′ ...uc,k−1 x˜k′} ∪ x˜k (9)
contains the actual state of the system for any timestep k ∈
N, that is, xk ∈ Iˆk, ∀k ∈ N.
Proof: We directly use the assumption that length of
attacks is at most Tmax. As shown in Fig. 4, this implies
that x˜k′ and x˜k may not be corrupted at the same time.
Let us consider both cases. If x˜k is corrupted, Tmax steps
before (i.e., k − Tmax = k′), the received measurement is
uncorrupted, that is to say, x˜k′ = xk′ . Hence, we can write
xk ∈ Postuk′ ...uk−1xk′ ⊆ Iˆk. Next, suppose x˜k′ is corrupted,
which means the measurement received at timestep k = k′+
Tmax is accurate, i.e., x˜k = xk. This is followed by xk ∈ Iˆk.
Thus, Iˆk contains the true state of the system in both cases.
Lemma 3 holds for any two measurements that have a
time distance of at least Tmax. This gives rise to definition
of the prediction-correction scheme below that recursively
computes set of predicted states Ip ⊆ 2X and set of corrected
states Ic ⊆ 2X . We assume the initial state set X0 is not in
the bad region. Also, for k < Tmax, we define Iˆk = X .
I0 = {x ∈ X0}
Ipk(I
c
k−1, uc,k−1) =
⋃
x∈Ick−1,uuc∈Uuc,δ∈∆
x+ u+ δ (10)
Ick = I
p
k ∩ Iˆk (11)
Using the sets defined above and the set of stealthy attacks
(8), we design an estimator system that receives as inputs the
measurements, the control inputs, and the detector’s statistics
and computes the smallest state set that contains the actual
state.
Definition 1: (Estimator System): Estimator system corre-
sponding to system (1) employed with the detector (7) is
Ik(I
p
k , I
s
k, x˜k) =
{
Ick x˜k ∈ Isk
undefined else (12)
Note that the set of stealthy attacks Isk describes how the
detector (7) affects the estimator system. In particular, if a
measurement x˜ is not in the set of stealthy attacks, i.e., x˜k 6∈
Isk , the output of the estimator system is undefined because
a detection alert is triggered. On the other hand, if x˜ belongs
to the set of stealthy attacks, i.e., x˜k ∈ Isk , the output of the
estimator is the corrected set Ick defined by (11).
Remark: There is a tradeoff between detector’s thresh-
old and estimator performance. More specifically, if the
detector’s threshold increases, the size of stealthy attack
space increases as well (Lemma 2), which leads to a larger
set of estimated states (Equation (3)). Consequently, more
restriction needs to be enforced by the supervisory controller
to handle this larger set of states.
B. Supervisory Control Problem
To formulate the supervisory control problem, we first
transform the infinite state space of the system model to a
finite set of discrete states. Similar to [10], we define a set
of discrete states Q and a mapping ` : X → Q as follows:
`i(xi) :=
 cτµ, for c ∈ Z s.t.cτµ− τµ/2 < xi ≤ cτµ+ τµ/2 xi ≤ βl
qi,m xi > βl
(13)
where l is the index of vehicle i’s road (i ∈ Πl). We define
`(x) as the vector (`(x1), ..., `(xn)). Further, we assume that
for all q ∈ Q, there exists some x ∈ X such that `(x) = q.
Let 2X/` denote the quotient set of 2X by the equivalence
classes induced by `. The supervisory control problem is
stated below:
Problem 1: Given 2X/`, design a supervisor σ : 2X/`→
2Vc that associates to each Ik ∈ 2X a set of inputs vc ∈ Vc
allowed for the interval [kτ, (k + 1)τ ] with the following
properties: (i) if vc(t) ∈ σ(Ik), then the trajectory of the
system is safe in the interval [kτ, (k+1)τ ]. (ii) if vc ∈ σ(Ik)
and `(Ik+1) 6= qm, then σ(Ik+1) 6= ∅. (iii) if σ˜ 6= σR and σ˜
is non-blocking and safe, then σ˜(Ik) ⊆ σR(Ik).
C. Resilient Supervisor Design
We construct a DES abstraction of the estimator sys-
tem and solve the supervisory control problem using the
abstracted model. More specifically, we take the following
steps: (1) Defining a DES with a set of events correspond-
ing to controlled inputs, uncontrolled inputs, disturbance,
prediction-correction, and detection such that the uncon-
trolled inputs and the disturbance events are unobservable.
(2) Constructing an observer of the DES and providing
conditions under which the observer is an abstraction of the
estimator system (3) Translating safety and non-blockingness
specifications to the DES domain, solving the supervisory
control problem given the observer, and translating the
obtained supervisor to the continuous time domain.
1) DES Model: We define a DES with an event set that
models controlled inputs, uncontrolled inputs, disturbance,
prediction-correction, and detection. This is similar to the
approaches used in [10] and [11]. Consider a five-layer event
set E = Λd×Λc×Uc×Uuc×W . The event sets Uc and Uuc
contain inputs of controlled and uncontrolled vehicles and are
defined as described in Section II. The set W represents a
discretization of the set of disturbances ∆, defined by W =
{kτµ : bδmin/(τµ)c ≤ k ≤ dδmax/(τµ)e}. The sets Λc and
Λd, which respectively represent prediction-correction and
detection, are as defined below.
Λc: Let any two inputs of Iˆ(·) be equivalent, if they
result in the same discrete set with respect to `(Iˆ(·)). That
is to say, given (9) and (13), define the equivalence relation
(x1, u1...uT−1, xT ) ≡ (x′1, u′1...u′T−1, x′T )⇔
`(Iˆ(x1, u1...uT−1, xT )) = `(Iˆ(x′1, u
′
1...u
′
T−1, x
′
T )). Define
φ := (x1, u1...uT−1, xT ) and Φ := X × UT × X . For
any φ ∈ Φ, let [φ] denote the equivalence class of φ under
relation ≡ and let Λc represent the set of equivalence classes.
These equivalence classes form a finite set of discrete events
λc ∈ Λc.
We say upon occurrence of event λc, there exists a
transition from a state q to itself if and only if there exist
some continuous element φ whose equivalence class is λc
[11]. To represent this, define the discrete function IΛ
c
(λc) :
Λc → 2Q as
IΛ
c
(λc) = {q ∈ Q : (∃φ ∈ Φ : [φ] = λc)[Iˆ(φ)∩`−1(q) 6= ∅]}
Then, define the transition function ψc : Q × Λc → Q,
which is shown to be the analogue of the estimate correction
(11) in the DES domain, as
ψc(q, λc) =
{
q if q ∈ IΛc(λc)
undefined else
Λd: Let any two elements (x, u, C) and (x′, u′, C ′) be
in the same equivalence class if their sets of discrete states
with respect to `(Is(·)) are the same. That is, given (8), let
(x, u, C) ≡ (x′, u′, C ′) ⇔ `(Is(x, u, C)) =
`(Is(x′, u′, C ′)). Define θ := (x, u, C), and Θ := X×U×R.
For any θ ∈ Θ, let [θ] denote the equivalence class of θ
under this relation. Denote by Λs the set of such equivalence
classes. The finite set Λd is defined by Λd := Λs ×Q.
To define the transition function corresponding to Λd,
define the function IΛ
d
: Λs × Q → {H0, H1}, for any
q˜ ∈ Q, by
IΛ
d
(λs, q˜) =
{
H0 ∃θ ∈ Θ : [θ] = λs, Is(θ) ∩ `−1(q˜) 6= ∅
H1 else
The transition function ψd : Q × Λd → Q, which
corresponds to the detector in the DES domain, is defined as
ψd(q, λd) =
{
q if IΛ
d
(λd) = H0
undefined else
where IΛ
d
(λd) 6= H0 represents detection of attacks.
Define the DES
G˜ := (Q˜, E, ψ, q0, Qm) (14)
with state set Q˜, event set E, transition function ψ : Q ×
E → Q, set of initial states Q0 ⊂ Q, and set of marked
states Qm = {qm}. Transition function ψ has the form
ψ(q, λd, λc, uc, uuc, w) =
ψ3(ψ2(ψ1(ψ
c(ψd(q, λd), λc), uc), uuc), w), and the lan-
guage of this system is (ΛdΛcUcUucW )∗. To avoid state
conflicts, we define intermediate states Q′, Q′′, QI1, and
QI2 such that ψd : Q × Λd → Q′, ψc : Q′ × Λc → Q′′,
ψ1 : Q
′′ × Uc → QI1, ψ2 : QI1 × Uuc → QI2, and
ψ3 : QI2 × W → Q. The uncontrolled inputs Uuc and
the disturbances W are not directly observed so we define
them as uncontrollable and unobservable. Further, we let the
controllable inputs Uc be observable and controllable, and
Λc and Λd be observable but uncontrollable [11].
2) Observer: System G˜ is a discrete event system with
unobservable events and we can design its observer Obs(G˜)
[7]. The states of the observer are information states ι ⊆
2Q˜ and its transition functions are: ψ¯d : 2Q × Λd → 2Q′ ,
ψ¯c : 2Q
′ × Λc → 2Q′′ , and ψ¯p : 2Q′′ × Uc → 2Q. Note
that by construction, all controllable events of Obs(G˜) are
observable and thus, an optimal supervisor solution indeed
exists.
We show that if δmin and δmax are multiples of µ, the DES
observer automaton constructed above is an abstraction of
(12) and its controller can be used to control the continuous
system. We use the notions of simulation and alternating
simulation [19]. In what follows, consider the observation
maps H2X (I) = `(I) and H2Q(ι) = ι, and the relation
R = {(ι, I) ∈ 2Q × 2X : ι = `(I)}.
Lemma 4: If δmin and δmax are multiples of µ, system
(12) alternatingly simulates Obs(G˜), and Obs(G˜) simulates
system (12).
Proof: (System (12) alternatingly simulates Obs(G˜)):
1) By assumption, for every ι0 ⊆ 2Q0 there exists I0 ⊆
2X0 with `(I0) = ι0; 2) By definition of the observation
maps, for every `(I) = ι we have H2Q(ι) = H2X (I); 3) We
need to prove for every ι = `(I) and for every u ∈ U2Q(ι)
there exists u′ ∈ U2X (I) such that for every (I, u, I ′) there
exists (ι, u′, ι′) satisfying `(I ′) = ι′. Consider any transition
(I, u, I ′) and let u = u′. The sets I and ι can be written
as I = [xl, xh] and ι = `(I) = {[ql, qh]}. Because δmin
and δmax are multiples of µ, we have ψ¯p(ι, u) = `(Ip) [9].
Then, ι′ = ψ¯c(ψ¯d(ψ¯p)) = `(Ip) ∩ `(Iˆ) = `(Ip ∩ Iˆ) = `(I ′).
(Obs(G˜) simulates system (12)): 1) By assumption, for
every I0 ⊆ 2X there exists ι0 ⊆ 2Q with `(I0) = ι0; 2)
It is similar to alternating simulation; 3) Let u = u′. We
know if `(I) = ι, then `(Ip) = ψ¯p(ι, uc). By definition,
`(I ′) = `(Ip∩ Iˆ(φ)) and by construction there exist λc = [φ]
and λs = [θ] such that `(Ip ∩ Iˆ) = ψ¯c(ψ¯d(ψ¯p, λd), λc) =
ι′. Hence, for every (I, u, I ′) there exists (ι, u, ι′) such that
`(I ′) = ι′.
3) Supervisor Solution: To construct a safe, non-blocking,
and maximally permissive supervisor at the DES level, we
use the solution to the Basic Supervisory Control Problem
in the Non-Blocking case (BSCP-NB) as described in [17],
[7]. The solution computes the supremal controllable sub-
language of a specification with respect to the language
of a system. More specifically, it computes the language
(Lm(H))↑C , where H is a specification and ↑ C is the supre-
mal controllable sublanguage operation [13]. The BSCP-NB
algorithm constructs a supervisor S such that Lm(S/G) =
(Lm(H))↑C and L(S/G) = (Lm(H))↑C , where S/G is the
system G controlled by S and L denotes the prefix closure
of language L [7].
We define the transition function, safety specification,
and set of marked states for the estimator system and then
translate it to DES domain [11]. The estimator system (12)
defines a transition system as follows:
(I, u, I ′) ∈→⊆ 2X × Uc × 2X if
∃x˜ ∈ X, I(Ip, Is, x˜) = I ′
Define a transition from (I, u, I ′) as safe if all trajectories
of the continuous time system corresponding to this transition
are safe:
(I, u, I ′) ∈ Safe ⊆→ if
∀x ∈ I, x′ ∈ I ′, (x, u, x′) ∈→(2)⇒ (x, u, x′) ∈ Safe(2)
(15)
Further, define the set of marked states as:
Im := {I ⊆ 2X : `(I) = qm} (16)
The safety specification (15) and the set of marked states
(16) are translated to the DES domain as follows:
(ι, u, ι′) ∈ SafeG˜ ⊆ 2Q × U × 2Q if
∀(I, u, I ′) ∈→, ι = `(I), ι′ = `(I ′) : (I, u, I ′) ∈ Safe
(17)
ιm := {{qm}} (18)
Solving BSCP-NB for Obs(G˜) with respect to the spec-
ifications (17) and (18), outputs a safe, non-blocking, and
maximally permissive supervisor [7]. Denote by S this safe,
non-blocking, and maximally permissive supervisor. Define
the supervisor map
σ(I) = {uc/τ : uc ∈ S(`(I))} (19)
We call (19), the resilient supervisory controller of system
(1).
Theorem 1: The supervisory controller (19) that asso-
ciates a set of admissible inputs vk ∈ Vc to each xk ∈ X ,
allowed for the interval t = [kτ, (k+ 1)τ ] solves Probem 1.
V. EXAMPLE
We consider two controllable vehicles driving on separate
roads approaching an intersection. Consider the set of inputs
Vc = {1, 3}, disturbances d = [0, 1]2, time-discretization
τ = 1, space discretization parameter µ = 1, maximum
attack length Tmax = 1, and detector threshold η → 0. Let
x0 = (1, 1), and suppose (α1, β1) = (α2, β2) = [9.5, 12.5],
so the vehicles collide if at a time t, 9.5 ≤ x1(t), x2(t) ≤
12.5. A marked state is reached if x > 12.5 for both vehicles.
We define an attack model known as surge attack. In
such attacks, the adversary adds the maximum error value
that bypasses the detector, that is to say, he keeps the
detector’s statistic at the threshold without exceeding it [5].
This required solving the equation C(k) + z(k)− b = η, for
every k ∈ [ks, ke). Using Lemma 2, the resulting attack at
k = ks is
x˜ks = xˆmax,ks + η + b
where xˆmax,ks = xks−1 + uks−1 + dmax. For the remainder
of the attack, which is k ∈ [ks + 1, ke), we have
x˜k = x˜k−1 + uk−1 + dmax + b
Note that we can replace xˆmax and dmax with xˆmin and
dmin to achieve similar results for negative error values.
To show how sensor attacks compromise safety, we first
consider the supervisor designed in [10] as the controller of
the intersection. Constructing the supervisor, the admissible
inputs for each cell q ∈ Q are shown in Fig. 5. Note that
since n = 2, the bad set B is bounded. The set of enabled
inputs for the initial state is σ˜(x(0)) = {(1, 3), (3, 1)}.
Suppose the vehicles select u = (1, 3) and the state evolves
to x(1) = x(0) + u(0) + (0, 0) = (2, 4). The attacker
receives the actual measurement x(1) and starts a surge
attack on vehicle 2 by transmitting the corrupted vector
x˜(1) = x(1)+(0, 1) = (2, 5). The detector will not trigger an
alert because x˜(1) ∈ Is1 . The set of admissible inputs for the
Fig. 5: Example of a stealthy sensor attack that compromises
safety.
Fig. 6: Observer of the two-vehicle intersection.
corrupted state is σ˜(x˜(1)) = {(1, 1), (1, 3)}, whereas for the
actual state this set is σ˜(x(1)) = {(1, 3)}. The input (1, 1)
is incorrectly enabled by the supervisor in the perceived
state and hence, selecting it may result in deadlock (i.e.,
unavoidable collision).
Next, we construct the resilient supervisor for the example
and show how the discussed stealthy attack is handled by the
supervisor. To implement the resilient supervisor, we need to
construct the observer of system G˜ as shown in Fig. 6. The
figure only shows the different choices of inputs for vehicle 2
and input of vehicle 1 is set to v1 = 1. Similar to the previous
case, let u(0) = (1, 3) be the first chosen input so the infor-
mation state of the system becomes ({2, 3}{4, 5}). Assume
the actual state is x(1) = (2, 4) and the attacker transmits
the corrupted measurement x˜(1) = (2, 5). The events λc =
[x˜(0), u(0), x˜(1)] and λd = [x˜(0), u(0), C(0)] occur and the
information state transits to ι(1) = ({2, 3}{4, 5}). The input
(1, 1), which caused collision in the previous case, is disabled
in this scenario since if selected, the vehicles may enter
any of the illegal states (4, 5), (5, 5), and (5, 6). Therefore,
another input is selected (e.g., u(1) = (1, 3)) and the vehicles
remain safe despite the attack.
To show how the state evolves in the following steps,
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Fig. 7: Simulation of the example in SUMO. Figures 7a and
7c correspond to the non-resilient supervisor and Figures
7b and 7d correspond to the resilient supervisor. The area
between the dashed lines represents the intersection.
we construct the observer for an additional sequence of
events as shown in Fig. 6. Assume the current information
state is ({3, 4, 5}, {7, 8, 9}). Upon occurrence of an event
λc, this information state has 4 possible successors. For
instance, if the new measurement is x˜(2) = (3, 8), then
λc = [(x˜(1), u(1), x˜(2))] with x˜(1) = (2, 5), u(1) = (1, 3),
and x˜(2) = (3, 8), and the successor state is ι(2) =
({3, 4}, {8, 9}). This shows how the measurements x˜(1) and
x˜(2), and the input u(1) are used to correct the predicted set
of states to a subset ι(2).
To simulate the scenarios, we use Simulation of Urban
MObility (SUMO). SUMO is an open source platform for
microscopic road traffic simulation [15]. The objects of the
SUMO simulation can be controlled through Traffic Control
Interface (TraCI), which uses a TCP-IP based client/server
architecture. We use the TraCI4Matlab implementation of
TraCI.
The simulations and their corresponding trajectories are
shown in Fig. 7. We assume vehicle 1 drives the same way
in both scenarios. Also, we assume following an unavoidable
collision, vehicles keep driving with the same speed. The
simulations confirm our previous discussion that the resilient
supervisor maintains safety even in the presence of sensor
attacks. In this case, this is done by disabling the unsafe input
(1, 1) at t = 1, and enabling (1, 3) at subsequent steps.
Although safety can be maintained for any finite Tmax,
the higher Tmax, the more restrictive the supervisor be-
comes. In other words, there exists a tradeoff between
Tmax and supervisor’s performance. To demonstrate this,
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Fig. 8: System remains safe if every pair of vehicles is safe.
one can extend the example by considering different values
of Tmax. If Tmax ≥ 4, inputs {(1, 3), (3, 1)} are enabled
at the initial state. Then, until a marked state is reached,
the supervisor disables all the inputs except the one chosen
at the initial state. This is clearly more restrictive than the
case of Tmax = 1. Nevertheless, for this example, even if
Tmax = (xm − x0)/(vmin + dmin) = 12, a solution exists.
Scenarios including multiple vehicles can be similarly
analyzed by verifying safety for each pair of vehicles (as
shown in Fig. 8 for a different network with n = 5).
The scalability of the proposed resilient supervisory control
system depends on the number of vehicles, number of control
inputs, minimum and maximum disturbances, discretization
parameters, and maximum attack length. Scalability can be
characterized based on the computational complexity for
implementing supervisors for partially-observed DES [21].
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of supervisory control of au-
tonomous intersections in the presence of sensor attacks. We
showed that the supervisory control system is vulnerable to
sensor attacks that can cause collision or deadlock among
vehicles. To improve the system resilience, we introduced
a detector in the control architecture with the purpose of
detecting attacks. There exist stealthy attacks that cannot
be detected but are capable of compromising safety. To
address this issue, we designed a resilient supervisor that
maintains safety even in the presence of stealthy attacks. The
resilient supervisor consists of an estimator that computes the
smallest state estimate compatible with the control inputs
and measurements seen thus far. We formulated the resilient
supervisory control system and presented a solution. We
demonstrated how the resilient supervisor works by consid-
ering examples.
Our solution can be extended to handle other attack mod-
els. Infinite length attacks and DoS attacks are special cases
of the attack model discussed in this work and can be studied
in a similar manner. Even though we focused on the analysis
of supervisory control of autonomous intersections, our tech-
niques can be applied to other cyber-physical system as well.
Future work include study of actuator attacks, development
of efficient methods for implementing resilient controllers,
and construction of decentralized resilient controllers.
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